Broadly speaking, in the following, we will examine the narrative trajectory of the thoughts, events, and philosophers from early times and onward, with some amount of analysis of these philosophies and their interrelations. A couple of things to make particular note of is the morphology, so to speak, of the ideas that philosophers present early on. By doing this, one might discern the degree to which an idea presented a millennium later are old or new: some ideas might be recontextualized, providing nothing new; some might be repackaging of ideas past; some refurbished, in a way; others might be admixtures of old ideas, a creative synthesis between two older ideas or philosophies that make something, for all intents and purposes, new; and some ideas, very, very rarely, will be wholly new, apparently created *ex nihilo*. A second item to watch for is the trajectory of philosophy, *per se*, by examining its function at any particular time, and examining what it seems to be doing throughout history. The primary contention to be sketched historiographically with the evidence available is that the progression of philosophy alienates thought, itself, from commonplace human experience. This can and will be seen through a number of occurrences in the history of philosophy, among the first being deanthropocentrism, such as with Thales and the Milesian School. This word, "deanthropocentrism," means the opposite of "anthropocentrism," which refers to placing the human at the center of the perspective, possibly even at the center of the universe. This thematic strand of alienating humanity from thought will rear repeatedly throughout, first appearing in ancient Greece with the "scientifically minded" Milesians, as they are so-called, on into contemporary philosophy, where philosophers like Daniel Dennett argue that consciousness is an illusion, not a real part of the existing world. This theme of trumping the senses, that is, that the content of the human senses are mere lies, is another approach to deanthropocentrism. It appears in all periods of philosophy, from Plato to Descartes to Wittgenstein. As this theme, in its

various manifestations appear, note will be made and some discussion will supplement the standard history of philosophy.

Our history of philosophy begins in ancient Greece. Philosophy did not begin in Greece, though many histories of philosophy and histories of intellectual thought refer to the "Greek miracle." Robert C. Solomon accurately points out that:

> 'Greece was not a "miracle" (nor was ancient India [and ancient Indian philosophy]): it was a lucky accident of history and the product of many unattributed lessons from neighbors and predecessors. … 'Indeed, it might be more enlightening to view the "miracle" in Greece not as a remarkable beginning but as a culmination, the climax of a long story the beginnings and middle of which we no longer recognize [i.e., have forgotten].'[1]

The limiting factor, in the early history of philosophy, is writing: we only have fragments of writings prior to a certain point in the past. For this reason, it is as Solomon remarked, the collective body of humanity has forgotten its own thoughts without a material medium to record them, or through the deterioration and destruction of the early-most written thoughts. However, rather fortunately, more than the meagre fragments of those earlier philosophers exist, because subsequent thinkers recapitulated ideas and in-texts remarks that are not contained in the remaining fragments. This is the case with some of the later philosophers, as well, such as Aristotle, who has a large body of work that still exists, but about eighty percent of his whole corpus is lost to history. In this case, Simplicius and other early philosophers provide ideas of Aristotle that would be otherwise lost and even titles of books that no longer exist. The same is true of biographical information, such as Plato's anecdote in the *Theaetetus* about Thales, though possibly apocryphal. The qualifier to be made in these cases is that it isn't entirely clear whether the ideas recapitulated are intact, the way that the author intended them. For instance, it

[1] Solomon, Robert C. *A Short History of Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 7

is not known whether the recapitulations are verbatim, paraphrase, or analytical, in the sense that they go beyond what the author actually said —or whether they said it, at all!

Enoch Stumpf remarks on what could be taken to be the grounds for a split from the earlier, standard understandings of the world (i.e., universe), when he says, 'What underlies these [philosophical] speculations was the gradual recognition that things are not exactly what they seem to be. Appearance often differs from reality.'[2] It rests in this that a conflict between μῦθος (i.e., muthos or mythos, as in "myth") and λόγος (i.e., logos, as in logic). This point presents itself in nearly all histories of philosophy, such as in Stumpf's *Socrates to Sartre and Beyond*: '[The early philosophers] approached … problems with a fresh point of view that was in stark contrast to the more mythical approach taken by the great poets of the times.'[3] However, it has not been treated as a central historiographical lens, as it shall be from here onward, in what shall follow. The turn toward λόγος is not something that happens all at once, because what turning to λόγος means is a kind of story-telling that eschews evermore the contents of human experience, instead story-telling in a principles-first fashion. One aspect that typifies the λόγος turn is that this brand of story-telling proceeds with an assumption that has an almost enlightenment flavor —that all humans should be able to arrive at Truth independently, and that other human beings can be persuaded of the Truth when they encounter it. Consider μῦθος, which requires that, in order for one to acquire its story, an older generation must tell the newer generation, and it cannot be arrived at independently; but that's not all. It also requires, not just the passing along of the stories of μῦθος, but also the ready acceptance of those truths. Thus, there is dogmatism inherent in μῦθος, whereas earnest, non-discipline-specialized philosophy, through λόγος, seeks to shrug off all dogmatism. By referring to "non-discipline-specialized" —

[2] Stumpf, Enoch. *Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy*. 7th ed. Boston: McGrawhill, 2008. p. 3
[3] Stumpf, Enoch. *Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy*. 7th ed. Boston: McGrawhill, 2008. p. 4

there's really no good word that I know of for it—, I mean the various "philosophies of," such as philosophy of religion, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of technology, philosophy of science, etc., which tend to enter into some degree of dogmatism for the sake entertaining possibilities within that discipline.