I recently attended a great lecture sponsored by IU Bloomington’s Center for the Theoretical Inquiry in the Humanities. The lecture was given by a very intelligent and insightful scholar, Laurence Hemming, who has a book coming out, called Heidegger and Marx: A Productive Dialogue over the Language of Humanism. Unfortunately, this scholar induced a facepalm of the likes the world may not see for quite some time. Okay, “facepalm” indicates a hell of a lot less insult than was my actual disposition, but I have gotten over the immediately induced state of having been insulted. The state was induced by his comment, which, maybe, he wanted to take it back as soon as he said it (I paraphrase slightly): “When the powers-that-be get together to discuss “rethinking money,” the last person you want in the room is a philosopher.” Continue reading
Category Archives: Economic Philosophy
Kahneman, Kusch, and Hacking: Formal Reasoning Systems as a Subset of Styles of Reasoning
There is an interesting fact about science, one that probably Kuhn was first to note: When we perform experiments and enter into a study, the scientist will do his or her best to jam any result into the box, and be completely satisfied with that. End of story. The scientist proved what they thought was or might be the case. This extends well beyond the natural sciences, and is much easier in some of the other empirical sciences, as will be seen in this bog post primarily on economics. I bring all of this up because of a paper I recently came across that deeply bothered me. Continue reading
Filed under Economic Philosophy, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
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