There is an interesting fact about science, one that probably Kuhn was first to note: When we perform experiments and enter into a study, the scientist will do his or her best to jam any result into the box, and be completely satisfied with that. End of story. The scientist proved what they thought was or might be the case. This extends well beyond the natural sciences, and is much easier in some of the other empirical sciences, as will be seen in this bog post primarily on economics. I bring all of this up because of a paper I recently came across that deeply bothered me. Continue reading
Kahneman, Kusch, and Hacking: Formal Reasoning Systems as a Subset of Styles of Reasoning
Filed under Economic Philosophy, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
My Journey from Physics to the History and Philosophy of Science (a.k.a. HPS)
Recently, at a reception for the incoming grad students of IU Bloomington’s HPS Department, I was faced with a question, but it was a more specific question than had previously been posed to me. Typically, I am asked, “How did you move from physics into philosophy of physics?” The question my host, Dr. Sandy Gliboff asked me, with the hint of a smirk and a sense of humor, “What made you decide to go into HPS, rather than be a real scientist?” I gave him my answer to the former question, which I will give presently; but I did not give him the answer to his question. Given that so many people ask so regularly, and given that there are so few physicists that go into philosophy, I will take this time to answer publically; and so I begin with the answer to the former. Continue reading
Filed under Personal
A Problem with Popular Physics/Science Books: The Problem of Authorship
It should be common knowledge that it isn’t wise to accept, without air of caution, someone’s opinion on a matter as absolute fact, if that person is not an expert in the given field. Consider popular physics, for the moment. What field is it that a physicist (or, as will be the case in the blog post, a mathematician) is expert of? That’s one question. Another is: What does the composition of works in popular physics entail? If the answer to the former is not the answer to the latter, then there is something wrong. I believe something is. Continue reading
The Impossibility of Precisely Measuring Positions of Particles in Quantum Physics
I am not going to go too hard on him, James S. Trefil, because he is such a fine author and I enjoy his work; but I must address an error that this physicist makes in one of his books, From Atoms to Quarks: An Introduction to the Strange World of Particle Physics (1980). (See my review of the book by clicking on this sentence.) I have chosen Trefil’s error for discussion, because he is a fine physicist, which makes for a good mark in proving a point, namely, that physics needs philosophy of physics to mind a number of problems that are not central to advancement of the science. These problems include the kind of conceptual one that will be mentioned —one that I hope other physicists do not err on— and conceptual problems in foundations, metaphysics, and so forth. Continue reading
Filed under Philosophy, Philosophy of Physics, Physics, Popular Science
Comparing the Great Books of the Western World to the Harvard Classics (Part II): Assessing the Fiction Selections
For all that I took the Harvard Classics to the woodshed in the first part of this series, the Great Books of the Western World shall get their fill in this one. Let me preface this post by saying that I will not too strongly impose my opinions upon the two sets of books, in the sense that I will only criticize selections on the basis of what I think is within the realm of acceptability. That is, I will criticize those selections which wouldn’t make my top 100 fiction selections, let alone my top dozen or two. Also, I will include epics in this discussion, and keep them separate from poetry, at least for the purposes of this post. Continue reading
Filed under Great Books and Harvard Classics Series, Literature
Personal Statement on Epistemology
While discussing philosophy on a discussion board, I had a discussant levy the claim against me that I am a nihilist. After telling this person that I am a scientist, a physicist, in fact, he or she flatly said that a scientist could not think as I do, told me to look at what I had previously said on the board, and that was the end of the conversation. This was not the first time that someone completely failed to understand my position on epistemology, so I have decided to make my position plain. First of all, I am not a nihilist, so let’s begin with my disposition and what I do believe. Continue reading
Filed under Philosophy
3rd Annual Brian Bolton 2012 Essay Contest Submission
It is doubtful that I will ever again, in anyway, come close to touching upon the topic of religion, on this blog. That a virtually endless tome would need to be written to properly convey my views —and still not surfeit— is certain. (My approach to understanding religion is much more from the perspective of understanding the human condition throughout history.) The essay I offer, here, is not oriented toward religion proper, so keep that in mind. The subject of the essay is religious institutions. As much as I will tend to avoid discussions on religion on this blog, institutions are open game. Moreover, I treat religious institutions and their activities, just as I would if they were banks —and, in fact, all of the ones I have ever been familiar with have been banks, inefficient ones at that, whereof much money is given, little returned, and, like the bankers, its officials are well sartorially endowed. At any rate, the attached is my entry to the 3rd Annual Brian Bolton Essay Competition essay competition.
In general, please do not leave comments that wander from the paper topic, because they will not make it to the discussion board. Comments on the function of religious institutions or the relationship of individuals to it (sociological, psychological, and so) are welcome.
Filed under Uncategorized
Comparing the Great Books of the Western World to the Harvard Classics (Part I): General Observations and Remarks
(attention: Please note that there are about a dozen works (a few more so in the Harvard Classics than the Great Books of the Western World) within each collection that I have not read, and I will do my best to note which those are. There are a few works, like Summa Theologica, of which I have read a portion through abridged editions or numerous excerpts, but I do feel competent, even in such a partial reading of these few texts, to comment upon their having been selected. Additionally, I have only read half of the books in the Gateway to the Great Books collections, and the same is true of the Harvard Classics’ shelf of fiction. Therefore, I will not comment on either of these.) Continue reading
Filed under Great Books and Harvard Classics Series, Literature
General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics: Unity through Metaphysics?
Within the physics community, there seems to be a problematic mode of thought, in trying to figure out how to unify quantum mechanics (QM) and general relativity (GR). Moreover, this mode is pervasive, unfortunately. The thinking goes like this: Given QM’s overwhelming success —it is often hailed as the most successful physical theory, to date— GR must be forced into a theoretical and mathematical vessel that exactly reflects QM. The subtlety contained in this thinking is that the interpretation of QM is independent of the endeavor to unify QM and GR, and, therefore, all problems completely reside in “fixing” GR. The problem with this mode of thought is that, among all problems, the greatest disparity in the realities of QM and GR resides in the mathematical divide, namely, that non-commutative algebras run rampant in one realm, whereas the other exclusively adheres to commutative algebras. Continue reading
Filed under Philosophy of Science, Physics
Ontology in the Holographic Cave
I wrote “Ontology in the Holographic Cave” while I was studying at Harvard University. My goal was to challenge the thinking of Dr. Justin Jungé and Dr. Rosa Cao (both formerly post docs under Daniel Dennett), both of whom are materialists, at least to some extent. My intention was to sway their opinions toward Transcendental Idealism, however so slightly. The challenge was unique because of all of the necessary prerequisites, before even entering into the rationale of the argument. As it was, I had spent nine weeks odiously applying —tongue in cheek— Occasionalism arguments to Hume’s problem of necessary causal connection, through Reichenbach’s work on causality (as in The Direction of Time), just for the sake of illustrating the limits of science that’s embedded in material empiricism. I think that I amused Dr. Jungé, anyway. Continue reading
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